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1. Introduction: different perspectives on argumentative interactions
The municipality of Paris mails free of charge to every home a monthly
information magazine titled Paris le journal [The Paris Diary]. This magazine
is perhaps not of outstanding journalistic value, but it is well done and for a free
service assumed by a political entity, it is surprisingly objective and
informative.
The highlight of the January 1999 issue is the budget of the municipality for
1999, voted by the City Council on December 15, 1998. On the cover, readers
are told in large and friendly letters that they will benefit from ‘une baisse
historique de l’impôt [a historical tax reduction]’ (see Fig. 1).1
On page 7, to which the cover refers, the readers are informed in more detail
about this historical reduction:
[...] le Conseil de Paris [...] a pris une décision historique: celle de baisser les
impôts à Paris. Cette diminution sera de 1%.
[ [...] Paris City Council [...] took a historical decision, namely, to cut taxes at
Paris. This reduction will amount to 1%. ]
At this point, a question may arise for the readers. What is so historical about a
reduction of merely 1 per cent? The readers may recall the welcome address
of Jean Tiberi, Mayor of Paris:
C’est la première fois, depuis de nombreuses années, que les impôts relevant
du budget de la Ville reculent en pourcentage; jusqu’à présent, ils
augmentaient invariablement d’un an sur l’autre.
[ This is the first time after many years that the percentage of taxes attributed to
the budget of the municipality decreases; up to now, they have invariably
increased year after year. ] (Paris le Journal, January 1999 issue, p. 5)
The reduction, then, is historical because it is unique, or at least, has not
occurred for a substantial number of years. But still, is this worth all the fuss?
Things become clearer a few paragraphs further in the article about the budget
decision. Jean Tiberi is quoted as explaining why he suggested that the City
Council adopt this reduction. One of his major reasons was this:
Cette décision doit également être comprise comme une illustration de la
politique préconisée par l’opposition républicaine au niveau national. Oui, il est

possible de baisser les impôts en France! Oui, les collectivités locales gérées
par l’opposition républicaine peuvent donner l’exemple et compenser avec les
moyens qui sont les leurs une fiscalité d’État qui se maintient à un niveau trop
élevé.
[ This decision has to be understood, furthermore, as an illustration of the kind
of politics which the republican opposition recommends for the national scale.
Yes, it is possible in France to decrease taxes! Yes, the local authorities where
the republican opposition is in charge can set an example and compensate, by
the means they have at their disposal, for a taxation whose assessment is kept
by the State at a level that is too high.]2
(Paris le journal, January 1999 issue, p. 7)

Selected frame from the cover of Paris le Journal, issue of
January 1999
In this quotation, the actual topic of the article is introduced. Unlike what the
national government claims, taxes can be cut; if the politicians are willing to do
their best, they can spare the citizens further charges. The whole of the article
to come plays on this theme: the national government, whose head is Prime
Minister Lionel Jospin from the Socialist Party, does not seriously think about
cutting taxes, and maybe will even raise them to pay the bill of a number of
governmental programs they have themselves engaged in. On the other hand,
the municipality of Paris, whose head is Mayor Jean Tiberi from the Rally for

the Republic – the opposition on the national scale –, does not only think about
reducing taxes but actually does so. The further it goes, the more the article
may well be read as a manifestation of an electoral ”pre-campaign.” In summer
1999, elections will be held in France, as in all countries belonging to the
European Union, for the Euro
pean Parliament.3
In a sense, then, the article has to be considered as flawed if its contents are
assumed to be a well-conducted argumentation. The characterization
‘historical,’ which is applied to the tax reduction, is revealed to be a catchword
designed to make the readers pay attention to what is to come. The 1 per cent
reduction is a good makeup to have them read the Mayor’s ”pre-campaign”
statement in favor of his party. Therefore, the article, if considered as an
argumentation, is flawed for one more reason, which is that it comes along as
an information yet quite clearly has the purpose of gathering votes.
Having elucidated that some dubious things happen, argumentatively
speaking, in this article and that, therefore, we should be on our guards when
reading it, I have analyzed the argumentative movement of the article. Have I,
really? Fundamentally, I agree that this is a valid analysis of it. But for purposes
of clarification as to what my point will be in this paper, I am going to take on
me the role of an advocatus diaboli and am going to claim that it is not. In my
advocatus diaboli role, I claim, instead, that what is done by this kind of
approach to an argumentative movement, is the following: it is not analyzed
but, rather, taken up and continued in order to argue against the argumentation
it presents.
At first sight, this claim seems to be void, for this is about exactly what a
scholar is supposed to do when analyzing argumentation. The scholar will not
argue against the movement, probably, but nonetheless will take it up and see
what it leads to, in order to be able to determine, for purposes of evaluation,
how it is pieced together. However, the distinction is less trivial as soon as the
following situation is considered. Imagine that I am with Jean Tiberi, Mayor of
Paris, and he tells me that I will benefit from a historical tax reduction of 1 per
cent. Most certainly, I will immediately ask him what is historical about a tiny 1
per cent reduction, in order to have him give me further information about this
point that I feel unable to handle such as it stands. He may then answer that it is
historical because it is the first time since a number of years that this happens.
And upon my further questions – because I still feel somehow uncomfortable
with this point – he points out that the municipality of Paris tries to counterbalance the increased charges the State government places on the citizens.
At this point, an argumentation scholar might analyze this dialogue as I have
done above. He cuts me out of the interaction and centers on Jean Tiberi’s
turns. But on the other hand, the dialogue might have developed completely
differently if I had insisted on the exact explanation of what is historical about a
1 per cent tax reduction in Paris. I might have wanted to know how this
reduction is balanced financially. It may be that the bill is paid by an increase of
the citizen’s contribution to street-cleaning, or the like. From this, it should be

obvious that I, as a participant to the interaction, do the same thing, to a certain
extent, as does the argumentation analyst. I review and evaluate what my
interlocutor tells me; and at places in which my evaluation encounters problems
of whatever kind, I consider what he tells me to be flawed in some way or other
or at least in need of further clarification or examination.
The difference between myself and the analyst is, rather, that I am ”in the
dialogue” whereas the analyst is ”after the dialogue.” I participate in it, and my
interventions do influence upon the further development of the dialogue. The
analyst observes it post festum and, hence, ”from the outside,” as it were, and
no effects of this for the dialogue are to be expected. When scholars analyze
finished written argumentative texts, this difference of perspectives is no
problem. However, it tends to be muddled up in the analysis of ”oral texts,”
dialogues, as well. And in these cases, I claim, a lack of distinction may lead to
questionable or erroneous reconstructions of what goes on in a dialogue,
interactively speaking.
In this paper, I will propose, therefore, a way of distinguishing between the
observer perspective and the participant perspective and I will point out which
advantages can be gained for the reconstruction and evaluation of
argumentative interactions if one distinguishes carefully between both of them.

2. Evaluative criteria from the observer perspective
By saying that the Paris Diary article about the 1999 budget is flawed because
it pre
tends to be objective information and yet resembles an electoral
campaign statement, I have appealed to norms that should be respected.
These are norms such as: a text should not imitate a text genre it does not
belong to, a magazine article should not mix up information and the political
positions expressed in a politician’s statements quoted in the article.
Furthermore, I said that I was concerned about Mayor Tiberi’s statement to the
effect that cutting taxes would be possible although the national government
acts otherwise. Again, this is because of norms I appeal to. For the statement
occurs in the scope of explicitizing what is so historical about the 1999 tax
reduction, yet I feel that it has not much to offer for doing so, and this is exactly
why I have the impression that something is wrong with it.
The norms about acceptable textual presentation and about acceptable
argumentative movements to which I appeal are given, so to speak, ”infracommunicatively.” That is to say that they are treated as being beyond
discussion and as governing the interaction. For this very reason I assume that
the author of the Paris Diary article should respect them too. These norms,
then, reflect the evaluator’s vision of what is acceptable and what is not with
respect to the point or action evaluated. However, it is not only the evaluator’s
vision of it; they very label ‘norm’ implies that the guideline in question is nonsubjective and applies to a number of people. Norms may be thought of as
either extrinsic or intrinsic. Extrinsic norms are those norms which are imposed

upon an activity and whose non-respect may cause (social) sanction but does
not directly influence on the activity itself. Intrinsic norms are those norms which
are co-substantial to an activity insofar as their non-respect makes it
impossible for the actors to engage in, or to continue, the activity in question.
Norms of politeness, for instance, are (largely) extrinsic. Note that shaking
hands is less common in North America than it is in Europe. However, it is,
despite possible problems of being fully accepted in a group of people,
perfectly feasible to strike up a conversation in Europe without shaking hands
after entering then room. The norm of shaking hands has no direct impact on
the activity of, say, small talk. On the other hand, if a soccer player punches the
ball forward using his hands, he does not respect a norm that is so
fundamental to the game of soccer that allowing its non-respect would mean
that the players are no longer playing the same game.
I have chosen deliberately an exemplification of extrinsic and intrinsic norms
which recalls John R. Searle’s (1969 : 34–37) distinction between regulative
and constitutive rules. Since the pragmatic turn in argumentation theory,
starting in 1958 by the pioneer
ing work of Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca and
of Toulmin, scholars advocating normative approaches to arguing have opted
for formulating norms as intrinsic rather than as extrinsic. Logical rules, for
instance, have to be considered as extrinsic norms because 1) they
presuppose closed semantic systems to which sequences of propositions are
compared; and because 2) they do not model arguing as a goal-oriented
activity but, rather, as a completed structure of relations between propositions.
It is a precondition for a justified model of an intrinsic normativity of arguing to
conceive of arguing as of a goal oriented activity taking place in social
contexts. This is the way chosen by one of the major approaches to
argumentation theory, the Amsterdam School’s Pragma-Dialectics, which
forms the normative core element of Normative Pragmatics, as developed by
van Eemeren, Grootendorst, Jackson, & Jacobs (1993).4
In Normative Pragmatics, arguing is assumed to be disagreement relevant.
That is to say that argumentative sequences are likely to occur when
disagreement seems to endanger further interaction.5 In instances of this kind
of communication problems, arguing can serve as a mechanism for
communicative repair (Jackson & Jacobs 1980; Jacobs & Jackson 1982;
1989; Jacobs 1989; Jackson 1995). Communication problems, then, are
interpreted as conflicts between different opinions the interactors hold of how
the interaction should continue. These conflicts of opinion can be resolved by
one of the interactors assuming the role of the proponent and justifying, to the
listener’s satisfaction, his stand
point with respect to the communication
problem. Hence, the interaction has a goal it pursues (conflict resolution)
because of which it brings about its intrinsic norms, the most important of
which is to exclude any move that might prevent the interactors from getting to
this goal and to further those kinds of moves which help them reach it. Moves
are accounted for in Pragma-Dialectics, and hence in Normative Pragmatics,
in terms of Speech act theory. Accordingly, the intrinsic norms of
argumentative encounters, brought about by its goal-orientedness, portray the

proponent as performing assertive speech acts (putting forth a standpoint and
advancing arguments for it) and the listener as performing commissive speech
acts (doubting a standpoint and accepting or not the arguments advanced).
Both of them may perform usage declarative speech acts, i.e., that kind of
speech act by which the exact meaning of an expression is rendered in more
detail. But any speech act other than the three types mentioned does not
further conflict resolution and therefore is eliminated from a normative
reconstruction of the argumenta
tive features of the interaction.
The proponents of Normative Pragmatics are aware that this model relies on a
num
ber of presuppositions which are postulated rather than extracted from
analyzed data. The most central presuppositions are that arguing can be
captured by rendering the interactors’ moves as assertives and commissives,
and that arguing is resolution-oriented. In order for this to be possible in real
life interaction, the argumentative encounter has to take place in a social and
interpersonal environment that furthers this kind of arguing. For instance, the
interactors must be willing to resolve the conflict of opinion that has occurred
”on the merits,” which, in turn, is unlikely to happen if resolving conflicts thus is
not, in their socio-cultural environment, a value for which people are ready to
strive. In Normative Pragmatics, these preconditions are termed ‘higher-order
conditions,’ meaning that these conditions have to apply in order to make it
possible for the resolution procedure to be carried out. This, in turn, is the very
reason why an analysis using the model of conflict resolution advocated by
Normative Pragmatics may presuppose these conditions to hold (van
Eemeren, Grootendorst, Jackson, & Jacobs 1993 : 24–89).
From the preceding, it is clear that a gap is manifest between the
reconstruction at which Normative Pragmatics aims and the actual practice
arguers perform. Nevertheless, the model for reconstruction is far from being
worthless: it can serve as a heuristic tool in the identification of argumentative
sequences6 and as an ideal in the pedagogy of argumentative debate.7 It has
to be kept in mind, however, that thus the model represents an observer
perspective analysis of processes of arguing. Although it displays intrinsic
norms, the type of reconstruction it favors is not interested primarily in the
interactors’ actual discourse-organizing moves. This is because it
presupposes these norms and higher-order conditions to hold and does not
pay much attention to whether or not they are indeed relevant to the interaction
analyzed, and if so, how this can be retrieved in the given data.
Therefore, if one sets out to give a fuller picture of the communicative process
of arguing, this kind of observer perspective analysis of argumentative
encounters has to be complemented by a participant perspective analysis
which pays close attention to the interactors’ discourse-organizing moves and
points out to which norms they appeal and whether they check – and if so, how
they check – whether these norms are respected.

3. Evaluative criteria from the participant perspective

Kenneth Lee Pike (1967 : 37–42) has offered a distinction between ‘etic’ and
‘emic’ approaches to the analysis of social interaction, to which the distinction
between the observer and the participant perspectives bears much
resemblance. According to him, an emic approach aims at reconstructing how
interactors make sense of others’ contributions within a specific system of
social interaction. An etic approach is a theoretically elaborated vision of how
interaction proceeds which does not, in the first place, take into account the
specificities of a given system and which, by way of consequence, constitutes
an initial approach to as yet not analyzed interactive systems, an approach that
is to be revised and modified, if necessary, for the reconstruction of specific
systems.8 Pike’s distinction is indeed acknowledged by Normative
Pragmatics. Referring to Pike, van Eemeren, Grootendorst, Jackson, &
Jacobs (1993 : 50–52) distinguish between interpretive (emic) and analytic
(etic) approaches and qualify Normative Pragmatics as more etic than emic on
grounds of the following:
[...] an etic scheme of reference is designed to reflect a theoretically principled
order of classification and to be capable of subsuming the emic system of any
particular speech community. (ibid. : 51)
As I suggested in the introduction, it would seem more adequate to me not to
subsume one type of reconstruction under the other, but rather to take them to
be complementary. This is in line with research objectives I hold which are
much less ambitious. Maybe some time in the future it will be possible to
subsume the communicative phenomenology of any actual speech community
under one systematic scheme. However, I don’t think so. Recent (and time and
again not so recent) work in ethnology and intercultural studies has shown to
what extent various cultures hold different visions of what fundamentals of
communication look like.9 At the present state of the art as regards the
process-centered analysis of authentic real-life argumentative interactions, I
am dealing, rather, with the very phenomenology. Thus, I hold normative
models – idealizing or not the process of arguing – to be a requisite of a
consistent analysis, but I do not see any reason why they should be primary.
This is just why I propose to integrate an etic and an emic reconstruction on a
complementarity basis.
By doing so, I am fundamentally in line with Pike’s reasons for distinguishing
etic and emic standpoints for the analysis of social interaction and with his
vision of how both kinds of perspectives can contribute to a fuller picture of the
interactive processes.10
Etic units and classifications [...] may be available before one begins the
analysis of a further particular language or culture. Regardless of how much
training one has however, emic units of language must be determined during
the analysis of that language; they must be discovered, not predicted [...].
[...] Hence, etic data provide access into the system – the starting point of
analysis. They give tentative results, tentative units. In the total analysis, the
initial etic description gradually is refined, and is ultimately – in principle, but

probably never in practice – replaced by one which is totally emic. (Pike 1967 :
37–39)
The major consequence of passing from a subsumptive to a complementary
connection between the etic observer and the emic participant perspectives is
that the guidelines or norms governing the interactive process of arguing must
not be thought of as being applied from an outside observer’s theoretically
elaborated normative framework. This is one kind of normative considerations
that come into play for the analysis. Still, normative considerations of another
kind must not be neglected. The arguers themselves more often than not
appeal to normative criteria their argumentative interaction should conform to,
and these criteria may or may not correspond to those applied to the
interaction from the observer perspective. A participant perspective analysis,
then, has to take seriously these appeals to argumentative norms the arguers
make and has to aim at retrieving cues for how the arguers appealing to them
display why they hold a norm to be respected or violated in a given interaction.
Let me illustrate this kind of participant perspective reconstruction with the help
of the following example which is taken from an audiotaped corpus of pre-court
mediations11 assembled by the Institut für deutsche Sprache (German
Language Institute) at Mannheim, Germany.12 This particular mediation
opposes Mrs Beck and Mrs Kraft. Either of them is in the autumn of her life and
they have been living in the same neighborhood for a number of years. Mrs
Beck has accused Mrs Kraft of having insulted her so massively that since then
she has been suffering from cardiac difficulties. The mediation session opens
with both the opponents’ versions of the issue. Mrs Beck the plaintiff’s consists
mainly in a pouring rain of insults she quotes Mrs Kraft as having said to her.
She sums it up, ‘des hot sie alles gsacht alles[she said all of
this, everything].’ Thereupon Mrs Kraft the defendant claims, ‘nein des is
nischt wahr[no, this is not true],’ and this denial causes Mrs Beck to
protest against what she assumes Mrs Kraft to be heading for. ‘awer nit
abstreite und misch als lügnerin denn sie is die
lügnern[but no denying, an’ – me a liar? ’cause she’s the liar].’ Mrs Kraft
once again defends herself against this reproach. ‘isch lüg net . isch
hab kein grund zur lüge[I’m not lying, I don’t have any reason for
lying].’
At this point, both the discussants have formulated, albeit indirectly, a norm that
should guide their attempts at finding a compromise. The mediation should
proceed without the parties lying. On the surface of it, this is in line with the
sincerity condition most argumentation scholars set up for goal-oriented
efficient argumentation. As regards Mrs Beck and Mrs Kraft, however, the
scholar is quite helpless if he adopts an observer perspective. Without having
witnessed the several insults with which both the parties reproach each other, it
is impossible for him to say whether or not the parties actually do lie, as the
respective opponents claim they do. The norm of sincerity as appealed to by
Mrs Kraft and Mrs Beck can be approached only from the participant
perspective, and that means that the analysis has to work out what exactly the

participants make of it. As a case study, let me show this with the issue
between Mrs Beck and Mrs Kraft.

4. Normative reconstruction of argumentative encounters from the participant
perspective
Sincerity, or rather, refraining from lying, is a recurrent issue between the two
women. The mediation takes relatively long, 45 minutes, and this is mainly
because both parties treat refraining from lying as a fundamental norm for their
discussion without whose respect there is no point in trying to get to a
compromise that would be to satisfy both. The encounter I am about to analyze
is far from what is generally called a resolution-oriented argumentation, and
time and again one may ask oneself, as an analyzing observer, if what is going
on in this mediation can legitimately be called an argumentation. But still, the
importance the interactors give to the norm of sincerity – and to related
preconditions of efficient dispute resolution, such as credibility and consistency
– would seem to be indicative of the arguers’ resolution-mindedness. This is
exactly why the norms to which they appeal have to be reconstructed from the
participant perspective, although to the outside observer, it may seem that they
are appealed to yet not respected.
Consider the following segment of the mediation, which is rather
representative of how it proceeds (‘B’ is Mrs Beck, ‘K’ is Mrs Kraft, ‘M’ is the
mediator).13

01

02

K

<1daß ich

<1loud-

M ja was hot se’n gesacht

er 1>

B

<2length-

<2waas2>

K se am arsch lecke soll1> ja

that I
well, what did she say, then

ened2>

what?!
might as well kiss her ass
yea
that’s a lie, that’s not at

04

B das is gelog/ das is
überhaupt
K
und daß isch/ undaß
B nisch/ oh des hawwe sie sisch

05

K isch blöd bin
B allesoige/

am dumb
your imagi…

K u n z u moi kinner bongert
zu

an’ further, calling my
children bas-

03

and that I, that I
all… uh, that is all only in

06

B

<3o c h d e s i s a l l e s

aah, all of this

K sache ischbinverheiratmoikinnersin
07

08
09
10

11

12

13

B g e l o g e 3> do mißte doch
die
K
keine bongert
B leit des a gehert habbe . des
B habbe sie sisch
zusammegeroimt
B <4sie lüge wie se vorgs johr

<3louder 3>

tards, I’m married, my
children
is a lie
if so, neighbors
would
ain’t no bastards
have heard this too; you have
made up all of this
you are lying just as you lied

K

i sch i sch brauch mi r gar

me, I need not make up

M

frau beck frau beck frau beck

Mrs Beck, Mrs Beck, Mrs
Beck
last year; do you think I’d
make

B geloge hawwe mäne sie ich
ded so
K
nix zusammeroime ganz
M und gar
emol langsam frau beck emol
langsam
B e irgend e rumlaferei mache wenn
isch
K
net . ja
M
frau beck emol langsam frau
frau
B meiner sache sischer wär4>
K kraft

<4louder 4>

anything, not at all,
calm down, Mrs Beck, calm
down
all the fuss or anything if I
you see
Mrs Beck, calm down, Mrs
Mrs
wasn’t sure of my facts?
Kraft

Sincerity is at issue here and is negotiated as it has been a few times before
and as it will be a considerable number of times later on. Mrs Kraft has
conceded that she might have insulted Mrs Beck, but this would have been only
because Mrs Beck had insulted her before. She quotes three insults, and Mrs
Beck calls this a lie (01–07B/K); Mrs Kraft would have made up the whole story
(04–05B). As a support for this claim, Mrs Beck advances two points: a) the
neighbors should have heard what Mrs Kraft claims Mrs Beck said – which
presumably they didn’t – (07–08B); and b) there would be a point in calling Mrs
Kraft a liar, for she would reportedly have lied last year (10–11B). Mrs Kraft, on
the other hand, affirms that there is absolutely no need for her to make it all up
(11–12K); by way of consequence, this means that Mrs Beck is not telling the

truth. While the mediator is losing control of the mediation, Mrs Beck advances
one more point to prove that she is sincere. The very fact that she has
complained about the insults and is ready to engage a mediation or a lawsuit
would be ample proof that she knows what she is talking about and that, hence,
there would not be any reason for her not to be sincere (11–13B).
Quite obviously, this discussion is a dead end. For the women try to discuss
about something which at the same time they take as a precondition for any
serious discussion, namely, their sincerity. The reproach to the effect that the
other would not respect the norm of sincerity, which either women addresses
constantly to the other, is precisely what blocks any discussion. It is obvious
that the kind of reproach found in Mrs Beck and Mrs Kraft’s discussion is an
efficient rhetorical manoeuvre. It can be used strategically to block discussion
about possibly questionable positions. This is exactly why one has to admit
that the normative reconstruction from the participant perspective, as far as I
have conducted it, has not really gone very much further. For it is not sufficient,
given the possibly strategic use of language, to retrieve in a given interaction a
norm to which the interactors appeal. In order to elaborate a justified
interpretation as to which norms are actually relevant, it is necessary,
moreover, to elucidate what the arguers make of these appeals. This is to say
that the analysis has to work out whether or not, and if so, how arguers display
what a norm to which they appeal, explicitly or not, means for them in a given
case. The analysis has to show whether or not they give their interlocutors a
”hint” as to how they would want it to be respected.
Let me illustrate this second step of a normative reconstruction from the
participant perspective by the following segment taken from the same
mediation opposing Mrs Kraft to Mrs Beck. For some time now, the less-thanideal discussion has been turning on the question as to who lies and who
doesn’t. At the moment the transcript below starts, to increase her credibility,
Mrs Beck has just pointed out that for 54 years she has been living in this
neighborhood and has never had any quarrel with her neighbors.

01

K

02

B

ja weil sie nie/ niemand
sisch
oh bei mir sitze jo/

K

abgibt weil sie . weil sie mit

03

B
K

04

B

mi t we m
jedem krach afange des
sacht
des sacht

this is ’cause no one wants to
have
oh, it’s at my place
that
anything to do with you, just
begather…
with
cause, ’cause you start
quarreling
whom
that’s

05

K

doch die ganz siedlung

B

hekschdend die fra
kellergeischt

K

<1extremely

driwwe die leut wo se
06

B
K

07

K

08

B
K

09

B
K

10

B
K

11

12

<2kein

lengthened1>

vorher gewohnt hawwe die
sache
mir sin froh daß mer die fra
<3ach3> dann sache
beck los hawwe
die

street where you used to live,
peo-

<3 upset 3 >

ple tell you: we’re happy we’ve
got
gosh! then
tell,

<4loud-

rid of Mrs Beck
it’s the
peotell me one single name

<2louder 2>

<4sache

sie . sache sie mir ein
name

er 4>

leut drüwwe4> ja
isch
dann i s e s
kenn se net mit name
fraue

die

neighborhood says so
down the
who?!
nobody!

ple down the street, you
see
I
then this
is

B

geloge

don’t know their names
woma lie

K

des sacht die gonz
siedlung
die gonz/ . sie kenne mir kän
äner

en the whole neighborhood
says
the whole… you can’t tell
me

do kenne se . jeden
hieschicke
nome sache vun de
siedlung

so; anybody can go and check
this
one single name in the
neighbor-

B
K

13

<1wer1>
mensch2>

with everyone; actually the
whole
only Mrs Kellergeist who says
so

B
K

the

jedes
14

B
K

15

B

genausokänntischzu ihne

whomI could as well tell you:

sa

hood
the

wo/ wo/ h ö r s c h n u r
die gonz siedlung kann sie

ever you ask,just…
whole neighborhood doesn’t

16

K

net

B

genau wie die frau
kellergeischt
leide

K
17

K

18

K
M

19

B
K
M

20

like
just as did Mrs Kellergeist
at
you

hot bei de samaridderbund
gesacht
. der fall jetz mit de frau
beck
oh heere se mer uff

the Workers’ Samaritans14

ah der indressiert misch
doch
ahmischkennt dochgar
niemand

oh, that doesn’t matter to me

now this person Mrs Beck
don’t even mention

<5fast5>

mit der des krigge se
gesacht

her
you,

at all; hold on
me at the Samaritans

M
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In this segment, one of the participants, Mrs Beck, clarifies how she wants the
norm of sincerity to be respected. Mrs Kraft claims that Mrs Beck’s point about
her peaceful character is irrelevant (01–04K): since everybody avoids her
because of her quarrelsome attitude she cannot possibly have any actual
quarrel with her neighbors. It would be even the case that people in another
part of the neighborhood, where Mrs Beck used to live before she moved to
the place next to Mrs Kraft’s, are happy that she finally moved away (05–08K).
In both cases, Mrs Beck wants Mrs Kraft to tell her whom she is talking about
(03B, 06B). She concedes that, probably, another woman living in the
neighborhood, Mrs Kellergeist, with whom Mrs Beck seems to be on rather
bad terms, might slander her name (04–05B). However, she urges Mrs Kraft to
tell her at least one name of a supposed calumniator (09B); and when her
opponent replies that she does not know these people’s names (09–10K), Mrs
Beck concludes, ‘dann is es geloge[then this is a lie]’ (10–11B). She
goes on to elaborate on this conclusion and to say that this claim of Mrs Kraft’s
has no justificatory potential as long as Mrs Kraft is not able or not prepared to
give at least one witness’s name for evidence. For such as it stands the claim
seems to be taken out of the blue, just as Mrs Beck too might have the –
unjustified – idea to say that nobody in the neighborhood wants to have
dealings with Mrs Kraft (12–16B).
Mrs Kraft’s claim—Mrs Beck’s call for evidence—lack of consistent evidence
—Mrs Beck’s conclusion that her opponent is not sincere, – this discussion
figure will reappear in the further dialogue in several slightly modified variants. I
have quoted one instance above: Mrs Kraft points to the Mrs Kellergeist Mrs
Beck just referred to, who would have said at a gathering of the Workers’
Samaritans that she would not want anybody even to mention Mrs Beck’s
name (15–19K). While the mediator is once again losing control over the
mediation (18–20M), Mrs Beck points out that the members of this association
cannot possibly know her (19–24B). By doing so, she displays once again that
she does not hold Mrs Kraft’s evidence for her claims to be consistent. And
once again, she elaborates on this by appealing to a norm of decent
(communicative) behavior: it is not suitable, she says, to call a person names
or to slander a person’s reputation when one does not even know this person
(24–27B). This elaboration is clearly at the service of the reiterated conclusion
to Mrs Kraft’s lack of sincerity (27–28B): ‘ach gott lüge sie (...)
sie sin vielleicht verloge[oh God, how you’re lying (…) how
incredibly untruth
ful you are].’ Mrs Beck even points to an instance in the past –
the birth of Mrs Kraft’s child – when Mrs Kraft would reportedly have lied as well
(28–29B).]15
In the segment I have left out, the same discussion figure reappears, and at its

end Mrs Kraft sums it up by stating explicitly how she would want Mrs Kraft to
respect the norm of sincerity. Mrs Kraft would be too vague in places in which
Mrs Beck asks for further preciseness; she would fail to be clear as to who are
the witnesses who back her report; and this is why, as far as Mrs Beck is
concerned, Mrs Kraft’s statement has to be taken as inconsistent and, hence,
untruthful; for every time Mrs Beck asks for further details Mrs Kraft would try to
bypass the required, more precise account of her point (31–37B). Now, the
mediator points out that at some moment the discussants have finally to get to
determining whether or not the mediation has been successful, and he thereby
interrupts the debate about sincerity (34–36M). Probably, if he had not done
so, the meanwhile well known discussion figure would have been reiterated
again and again.
From the observer perspective, the analysis is led to pointing out once again
that this discussion is a dead end as far as cooperative conflict resolution is
concerned. The very fact that the same discussion figure about Mrs Kraft’s
sincerity is reiterated over and over again is sufficient for assuming that, in
terms of resolution-orientedness, the discussion does not go any step further.
However, from the participant perspective, the analysis is led to taking
seriously Mrs Beck’s attempts at displaying her vision of how the norm of
sincerity should be respected. As both women treat the norm of sincerity as a
precondi
tion for efficient mediation or conflict resolution (03–11B/K in the first
transcript), there is indeed no point in discussing as long as they do not agree
that both of them do respect this norm. The dead end is just because Mrs Beck
gives a broad sketch as to how the norm in question should be respected and
because, nonetheless, Mrs Kraft neither conforms her statements to this sketch
nor engages in a (meta)discussion about the appropriateness of Mrs Beck’s
vision of respecting the norm of sincerity.16
A normative pragmatic observer-perspective analysis leads to pointing out that
Mrs Kraft and Mrs Beck’s discussion hardly conforms to standards of efficient
resolution oriented discussion. Hence, it can be assumed that certain higher
order conditions, such as the discussants’ resolution mindedness, do not
obtain. A complementary normative reconstruction from the participant
perspective, on the other hand, stresses the fact that a considerable number of
phenomena, such as Mrs Beck’s attempts at displaying her vi
sion of
respecting the norm of sincerity, would indeed suggest that the participants are
resolution-minded to a great extent. Such a participant-perspective
reconstruction, then, has to speak to the fact that Mrs Beck and Mrs Kraft do
not really go any further towards resolution despite their co-operativity. The
cardinal question here is to know if there are cues that allow for determining
whether or not the portions of the discussion which would suggest resolutionmindedness are used strategically. For if so, it is just them which are likely to
block any actual resolution.

5. The analysis from both perspectives combined

In the interaction analyzed, there are indeed cues which allow for a justified
interpreta
tion of the linguistic material exchanged as not being used
strategically. Despite the consequences her behavior has (it blocks any cooperative discussion to speak of), Mrs Beck does not seem to demand
constantly her opponent’s sincerity for purposes of blocking intently any
discussion. This is obvious from the end of the mediation (that I have not
quoted): the mediator tells Mrs Beck that she does not act reasonably, and she
is deeply surprised and shocked that one might qualify her behavior as
unreasonable.17 But more importantly, if Mrs Beck used strategically the
discussion figure regarding her opponent’s sincerity, it is hardly plausible that
she would apply it unchanged over and over again without noticing that it does
not have the desired effect and even weakens considerably her own position,
up to having herself called unreasonable in the end.
What is to be learned from this for a normative reconstruction from the
participant perspective is the following. Although both the opponents have
agreed – relatively explicitly – that sincerity is a precondition for any serious
discussion (see the first transcript), as far as either of them is concerned, they
hold their respective opponent not to be sincere. That is, they agree in
abstracto on a norm that should be respected, but they disagree in concreto
that a given communicative behavior can consistently be seen as respecting it.
In Pike’s terminology, they take an etic perspective on argumentative
interactions, from which they determine context-independently how an
interaction can get them to joint conflict resolution; and they take an emic
perspective on this particular argumentative in
teraction to see whether or not it
conforms to this picture. In my terminology, they are at the same time
observers and participants to their interaction, checking continuously whether it
proceeds as it would according to their vision of how it should do. In the
mediation analyzed, Mrs Beck is clearly of the opinion that the actual
discussion does not proceed as she would want it to.
It is no coincidence that I have chosen Kenneth Pike’s etic-vs-emic framework
to account for where and why Mrs Beck feels that there is a gap between
‘ought’ and ‘is.’ This can be rendered on the grounds of the traditional structural
concept of a semiotic triangle in which a linguistic expression refers via a
mental concept to an object or a state of affairs in the world.18 Mrs Beck and
Mrs Kraft’s different interpretations of the situation stem from the fact that one
of them (Mrs Kraft) holds that to a certain referent – her communicative
behavior –, a certain concept and the corresponding linguistic expression –
sincerity – may be applied, whereas the other (Mrs Beck) does not. In other
words, in the opinion of one of them the semiotic triangle is broken, in the
other’s, it is not. Although their (etic) observer perspectives converge, their
(emic) participant perspectives differ. Rather than a pragmatic incompatibility,
the reason for this is a semantic divergence.
To illustrate this, let me reconsider, from the standpoint of structural semantics,
Mrs Beck’s insisting that Mrs Kraft should say plainly who are the witnesses
backing her point. In (09–13B), in the second transcript, Mrs Beck explicitly

states that Mrs Kraft’s failure to give the names of her supposed witnesses is
sufficient for holding her point to be a lie. In other words, the concept (or
signifié, as Saussure called it) to which corresponds the linguistic expression
(Saussure’s signifiant) sincere has among the semantic units, or: semes, from
which its signification is constructed at least a cluster of semes such as
[+HONEST –BIASED +ACKNOWLEDGING FULLY +TRUTHFUL]. That is
why, based on this cluster of semes, no (communicative) behavior that is partly
constituted by withholding information or by transmitting distorted or
incomplete portions of information can be qualified as sincere. By way of
consequence, any behavior to which these semes do not apply may be said to
violate the norm of sincerity, which Mrs Beck and Mrs Kraft have set up for their
discussion. The reasons for the women’s diverging attitudes, then, are not to
be found, in the first place, on the pragmatic level (which norms should be
respected?); the women agree that they should be sincere. Their
disagreement takes place on the semantic level. On the one hand, a given
(communicative) behavior is held by one of them to correspond, on the basis of
the aforementioned cluster of semes, to the signification of the linguistic
expression sincere and, hence, to respect the norm in question. On the other
hand, this very (communicative) behavior is held by the other woman not to do
so and, hence, to violate the norm. The question as to whether or not Mrs
Kraft’s statements have any justificatory potential as long as she does not give
the names of her supposed witnesses, is a particularly plain example for this.
Mrs Beck interprets Mrs Kraft’s behavior as withholding or distorting
information; it then has to be qualified as insincere. However, Mrs Kraft does
not think so; in the portion of the dialogue I have left out, she considers, upon
Mrs Beck’s reiterated call for witnesses’ names, that she might give them to
her after she herself will have known them, but she continues immediately by
saying, ‘des spielt doch kä roll[that doesn’t matter in the end].’
Unlike Mrs Beck, Mrs Kraft is not of the opinion that giving these names is
indispensable in order for her (communicative) behavior to ”merit” the label
sincere.
Obviously, this issue is not, or not mainly, an issue about matters of fact. What
is at stake is whether or not certain labels (signifiants, linguistic expressions)
can be applied to a given referent (signifié, thing); here, whether or not Mrs
Kraft’s (communicative) behavior corresponds to the signification of the label
sincere.19 One may be tempted to treat this ”struggle” about semantics, about
labeling as irrelevant to the discussion proper because, structurally speaking, it
is anterior to it or is on a meta-level on which the conditions for discussing are
negotiated and hopefully agreed upon. However, these structural stages, or
levels, of the discussion intermingle in the ongoing argumentative dialogue, for
establishing Mrs Kraft’s sincerity or insincerity is a genuine part of the very
issue the mediation session has gone to at this point, namely, to know whether
or not Mrs Kraft lies when she claims that Mrs Beck has a quarrelsome
character. For she must not lie since she has committed herself to the norm of
sincerity. As a consequence for a reconstruction from the participant
perspective, these intermingling functional stages, or levels, must not be
separated from the sequential interactive context in which they occur.

Whether or not Mrs Kraft’s behavior (to claim that Mrs Beck has a quarrelsome
character) ”merits” the label sincere is indeed irrelevant, on a strict
propositional or inferential basis, to resolving the issue about Mrs Beck’s claim
that Mrs Kraft has insulted her so massively that she has been suffering from
cardiac difficulties. However, it is not irrelevant on a communicative basis. For
this very issue has led the arguers, once they have committed themselves to
the norm of sincerity, to a closer examination as to whether or not the label
sincere is justified in a given case. That is just why the sincerity issue is able to
block any serious discussion to speak of about the insult issue which the
mediation session is supposed to settle or to resolve. From the participants’
perspective, then, the issue about Mrs Kraft’s sincerity is not just a labeling
affair. Instead, it is a genuine part of the very discussion about Mrs Kraft’s
supposed insults. As far as the communicative process of arguing is
concerned, this semantic struggle, therefore, is as important a part of the whole
discussion as the arguments proper which are advanced for or against the
standpoint taken by one or the other of the arguers.
By paying close attention both to the arguments about matters of fact and to
the clarifying sequences which may lead to semantic struggles, an analyst can
give a fuller picture of what happens in a discussion communicatively. From the
observer perspective it can be accounted for how an argumentation is pieced
together once it is completed. From the participant perspective it can be
added how the ”pieces” are introduced into the overall argumentative structure
during the communicative process, and it can be checked whether norms for
efficient conflict resolution that are elaborated from the observer perspective
are relevant to the case at hand. Furthermore, if the latter is the case, a
participant perspective analysis can show how the interactors display to their
interlocutors that they hold a certain norm to be relevant, and it can determine
whether or not the interactors check if it is indeed respected. An analyst can
thereby point out how arguers ”build up” interactively the completed
argumentation and why, if applicable, they did not manage to get to conflict
resolution.

6. Conclusions
In the present paper, I set out to put new life into Kenneth L. Pike’s distinction
between an etic and an emic approach to social interaction. I advocated a joint
etic – ob
server perspective – and emic –participant perspective – analysis of
the communicative process of arguing. From the observer perspective, I
assumed, in line with Normative Pragmatics, that arguing occurs when
interactors face a communication problem (e.g., a conflict of opinion) and cooperate enough to try to solve it by way of advancing arguments for or against
a problematic position. With such a concept, arguing is conceived of as a goal
oriented activity and thereby equipped with a normativity inherent to this very
activity. Such a theoretically elaborated model of arguing in conversation is a
valuable heuristic tool for the identification of argumentative sequences in

dialogues; for the functional elements of a premise(s)–conclusion complex,
which are traditionally assumed, are but very rarely plainly expressed in
authentic real life dialogues.
From the participant perspective, I investigated methods and ways of
accounting for whether or not the norms brought about by the assumption of cooperativity and resolution orientedness are indeed relevant in the piece of
discourse analyzed. I presented a dialogue in which the interactors commit
themselves relatively plainly to norms of efficient conflict resolution. Yet
although they agree on guidelines for their attempt at resolving their problem,
they, nevertheless, do not really get any step further towards conflict resolution.
That is, the former seems to suggest that they are resolution-minded, and the
latter would rather suggest that they are not. An exclusive observer perspective
analysis could hardly go beyond the statement that despite their call for
sincerity as a precondition of conflict resolution, the interactors do not act in
such a way as to make conflict resolution likely to occur. A joint observer
perspective and participant perspective analysis, on the other hand, yields the
following result: The interactors appeal to norms that should guide their
attempts at finding a solution to their problem, and they even agree on the kind
of norms to be respected. However, they hold different opinions as to which
communicative behavior can be qualified as respecting these norms. In other
words, that the norm is agreed upon in abstracto does not mean that
automatically the interaction can proceed without problems. For depending on
either interactor’s vision of when a certain characterization (in the discussed
example: sincere) is applicable to a referent (in the example: Mrs Kraft’s
communicative behavior), a given referent may be held by one interactor to be
of such a kind that it respects the agreed upon norm, whereas other interactors
may be of a different opinion. (In the example, Mrs Kraft takes it to be sufficient
for establishing her sincerity that she points to anonymous neighbors who
witnessed situations in which Mrs Beck’s quarrelsome character was manifest;
Mrs Beck, however, is of the opinion that Mrs Kraft has to state these
supposed witnesses’ names).
Therefore, in a discussion, two kinds of argumentative movements20 are likely
to occur. On the one hand, there is the discussion proper about a problematic
position. According to a model of co-operative arguing, such as the one
advocated by Normative Pragmatics, this kind of discussion is designed to
allow for joint conflict resolution. As to this kind of argumentative movement, the
arguers can be assumed to do roughly the same thing as an analyst, namely, to
adopt an etic perspective and to observe, so to speak, their own interaction in
order to know whether or not it gets them closer to this goal. On the other hand,
this model is but an abstract scheme of how the interaction could proceed in
view of effective resolution. The arguers cannot determine whether they come
closer to conflict resolution unless they compare the ongoing interaction to the
model. That is to say that the arguers, being participants to their interaction,
adopt an emic standpoint as well and try to make sense of others’
contributions in terms of resolution-orientedness. It is at this point that gaps
and divergences may occur. The arguers may hold different opinions as to

whether or not a contribution does indeed fulfill the argumentative function one
interactor wants it to fulfill, or whether or not one or all of them are sufficiently
resolution-minded.
The argumentative movement resulting from the arguers’ adopting an emic
perspective, then, is largely about the bases on which the discussion proper
about a position rests. From a strict structural viewpoint it can, therefore, be
conceived of as being anterior to the discussion proper or as taking place on a
meta-level. This is impossible, however, if the analyst sets out to reconstruct
the communicative proc
ess of arguing as organized by the arguers
themselves. For etic and emic argumentative movements intermingle in the
course of discussion and influence upon each other. To give a fuller picture, in
terms of communicative interaction, of what happens when people are
discussing, I have proposed, therefore, to integrate both perspectives and to
conceive of conversational arguing as proceeding genuinely by both kinds of
argumentative movements.
For the exemplary analysis I presented, I chose one of the most delicate
current issues in argumentation theory and analysis: Are theoretically
elaborated intrinsic norms indeed relevant for the arguers, and if so, how can
this be shown in the linguistic material exchanged? It has turned out that from
the etic perspective (the arguers observe their own interaction to determine its
extent of goal-directed efficiency), norms for co-operative arguing – in the
example, the norm of sincerity – are relevant.21 Certain trans-situative and
trans-individual standards of arguing are appealed to by arguers. However,
dispute may arise about whether or not the interaction the arguers are having
conforms to these standards. That is to say, the norms are relevant from an etic
perspective, but whether they are indeed effective and respected may be
subjected to negotiation from an emic perspective. That is the reason why
norms of co-operative arguing (e.g., sincerity, soundness, consistency,
credibility etc.) are seldom called into question in actual argumentative
encounters. What is often called into question, however, is that a certain
argumentative behavior does indeed conform to these norms. Therefore, what
is at issue in the argumentative movement proceeding from an emic
perspective are not so much matters of fact, i.e., the discussed position
proper, as issues as to how to label ”correctly” a certain referent (e.g., one
interactor’s communicative behavior or a state of affairs about which one
discusses). The etic observer perspective reconstruction is faced with the
discussion proper about matters of fact, and typically it will end up with
determining which arguments are advanced for or against which standpoint
and how arguments ”hang together,” i.e., corroborate or weaken each other.
The emic participant perspective reconstruction, on the other hand, is faced
mainly with paying close attention to the semantic struggles, to the efforts of
”correct” labeling taking place during the discussion.22 For these activities, as
I have shown, are not just labeling. They represent a genuine part of the
arguers’ discourse-organizing moves (and hence of a possible success of the
resolution-oriented argumentative encounter). These labeling efforts are the
major expression of the arguers’ co-operative attempts at negotiating, in

instances of doubt or disagreement, whether or not the norms they have
themselves committed to are indeed respected, and if not, how they would
want their interlocutors to respect them.
From the analysis I have presented and the conclusions I have drawn, it is clear
that there is sort of an affinity between, on the one hand, the observer
perspective and the reconstruction of the discussion proper and, on the other
hand, between the participant perspective and the reconstruction of semantic
struggles and the negotiation of labels. The observer perspective
reconstruction, based on the assumption of a resolution-oriented
argumentative procedure, is concerned primarily with what the arguers
discuss, and it is an as yet indispensable way of identifying argumentative
sequences. The participant perspective, based on the sequential succession
of the arguers’ moves, is concerned mainly with how arguers discuss what they
discuss, and it is similarly indispensable for suggesting why an agreement has
or has not been reached in an argumentative encounter. It should be borne in
mind, however, that this distinction is far from being as clear-cut as it might
seem from my presentation. For in the analyzed mediation session, the
institutional setting provides for determining relatively easily (from the observer
perspective) what is the actual topic of the discussion. Moreover, Mrs Kraft and
Mrs Beck’s dis
cussion is such that the norms the arguers appeal to and the
way in which they would want them to be respected can be extracted from the
material (from the participant per
spective) without major problems of
interpretation.
In most argumentative encounters – especially in non-institutional ones –, this
is different. Often neither the issue of the discussion nor the norms that should
guide the discussion are expressed plainly. Whereas in such cases, the
observer perspective reconstruction can rely on the assumption of a cooperative procedure and on the inherent normativity it brings about, the
participant perspective reconstruction has to center on the interpretive
processes performed by the interactors themselves. At this point, work
remains to be done. With respect to norms and their relevance for
conversational arguing, methods have to be looked for of determining when
semantic struggles are engaged for strategic reasons. Furthermore, as
systematic a repertoire as possible should be elaborated of the norms to
which arguers do appeal, and this repertoire should show how arguers display
to their interlocutors that they check whether or not the norms to which they
have appealed – implicitly or not – are respected. The analysis I have
presented is a starting point for the latter of these two lines of research.

Endnotes
1The complete text is: ‘Budget 1999 A historical tax reduction for the
Parisians; p. 7 General services: 19%; Burden of debt: 7%; Social services:
22%; Environment and local development + housing + ecological activities +
transport: 35%; Culture, socializing, sports and events: 8%; Education: 9%

Expenses: Priorities confirmed anew’ N.B.: All translations in this paper are
mine.
2Note that ‘republican’ implies no connotations of political couleur, such as in
the name of the U.S. Republican Party. In France, the adjective républicain is
roughly synonymous to ‘national’ (or ‘federal,’ depend
ing on the type of
administration of a country), meaning that what is characterized as républicain
applies to the whole of the nation, not only to a local or regional authority. As
opposed to the French adjective national, it mostly implies, in political
discourse, that furthermore the one(s) using it claim(s) the democratic tradition
going back to the French Revolution in 1789 and its fundamental
revendications of Freedom, Equality, and Fraternity. As such, it is used
indifferently by all French political parties.
3Citizens of federally organized countries may wonder why a comparison more
or less on equal grounds is made between the State and one of its cities,
albeit the capital city. Note however that after (at least) 300 years of centralism
in France, the political and economic importance of the municipality of Paris is
largely beyond that of any other local or territorial authority in France. Consider,
for instance, that nearly a fifth of the French population lives in the Paris region;
as regards culture and education, estimations run up to 80% of cultural life,
50% of research activities, and 30% of higher education being centralized in
the Paris region.
4See, in particular, pages 1–59. As to the foundations of the pragmadialectical theory, see van Eemeren & Grootendorst (1984). Overviews over
the theory, centering on its different aspects, can be found in van Eemeren &
Grootendorst (1992 : Part One), Gerritsen (1995), Kruiger (1995),
Fundamentals (1996 : chap. 10), Rühl (1999).
5This way of putting it requires the assumption of a ‘preference for agreement’
of interaction, as put forth, e.g., by Jackson & Jacobs (1980). Scholars have
been able to show that there is some problem involved in this assumption as
long as the kind of interaction or of situation it is supposed to apply to is not
specified; see, e.g., Bilmes (1993). It shall be obvious from this paper that
although there is a point in this criticism, the preference-for-agreement
assumption is, nonetheless, a valuable heuristics in the identification and
reconstruction of argumentative sequences.
6The identification of arguing in colloquial speech is far from being as easy
and clear-cut as a good deal of scholarly contributions tend to assume. The
central elements of the traditional model of a premise(s)/conclusion complex,
the starting points and the conclusion leapt to by an argumentative inference,
are indeed expressed in a great many wr i t t e n argumentative texts. Still, it
is very rare to find dia
logues, for instance as recorded by discourse analytical
transcripts, in which starting points or conclusions can be located more or less
unambiguously. As to the problems the identification of arguing in dialogue
involves, see, e.g., Spranz-Fogasy (1999).

7The pedadgogy of arguing is one of the aims pursued by Pragma-Dialectics;
see van Eemeren & Grootendorst (1992 : 10–11).
8Pike starts at a traditional structural viewpoint. That is why he speaks of
theoretical etic systems applied from the outside, and (internal) emic systems
which have to be ‘discovered’ by an analyst, as he has it. Throughout this
paper it shall be clear that my point is less of a structural and more of a
discourse ana
lytical one. Accordingly, I am somewhat uneasy with the concept
of (structural) systems of interaction. Obviously, in presenting Pike’s distinction
I respect his terms.
9Although it has been carried out with research objectives different from mine,
the ethnological work done be Claude Lévi-Strauss (1967 [1949]; 1962) or
Clifford Geertz (1973) offers ample insights as to this diversity. As far as
arguing and rationality are concerned, consider that in Chinese the word
meaning ‘wisdom; intelligence; knowledge’ – zhì – is often synonymous to the
word jì, meaning ‘stratagem; cunning’ (and sometimes ‘ruse; trick’) (von
Senger 1996 : 21). Furthermore, there is no direct equivalent of the
adversative conjunction but in Chinese; the expressions used are ke shì and
zhi shì, meaning literally, ‘it is possible/it may be that this is exact,’ and ‘only is
it the case that.’ In other words, the adversation itself is not expressed at all;
instead of establishing an adversative or confrontative relation between a
preceding and a subsequent utterance, the oppositive connection of
utterances is smoothened, so to speak, and on the surface of it, the preceding
utterance is not ”attacked” but, rather, its communicative relevance is taken
away (something like, ”be that as it may, what counts is the following”).
Although I certainly do not want to overstress this sort of linguistic metaphysics,
it is worth mentioning that in other cultures the interactors’ communicative
attitudes very often differ radically from what is common in our Western culture;
and this seems to be the case not only because of different norms of
politeness and facework.
10Note that I hold it to be no problem to substitute ‘social interaction’ any time
Pike speaks, for obvious reasons, of ‘language’ and/or of ‘culture.’ The units
and classifications to be applied change, but the relationship between the etic
and the emic standpoint with respect to the object of analysis is essentially the
same.
11In Germany, parties engaged in a legal dispute can be summoned to a precourt mediation session if the case is likely to be dismissed in court. This is
because of, essentially, two reasons. 1) In most of the cases, pre-court
mediation is engaged in ”classical” conflicts between neighbors (insult,
calumniation, minor theft, …), and pre-court mediation then is designed to
spare courts (constantly overburdened in Germany) the bureaucracy of legal
proceedings which will very probably be dismissed anyways. 2) Since the
complaining parties most often live next to each other, a mediation may settle
the conflict to either party’s satisfaction when legal proceedings would possibly
be interpreted exclusively in terms of winning and losing, thereby deteriorating

further the ”micro-climate” in the neighborhood.
12The transcript is #3001/02 at Institut für deutsche Sprache, Mannheim,
Germany. The material has been published previously in Schröder (Hg.)
(1997). The following reconstruction owes much to Arnulf Deppermann’s (1997
: 310–326) analysis of the same piece of dicourse in the scope of pointing to
rhetorical techniques the interactors use in order to try to establish their own, or
to undermine the opponent’s, credibility.
13Transcription conventions have been reduced since the transcript does not
serve, in the first place, the analysis of oral communication. Cells are
numbered consecutively to the left. Underline indicates that the segment is
stressed specially; dotted line indicates that it is lengthened. A period ‘.’ refers
to a short pause up to 1 sec, a slash ‘/’ to an interrupted word or phrase.
Material that is hardly understandable is put between parentheses or left out
‘(…)’ if not understandable at all. Futher comments are numbered and given in
a column to the right of the transcript; the comments refer to the material put
between pointy braces. Simultaneous production or overlap of material has
been respected in the transcript proper, but only very roughly in the English
translation to the right. (In order to do so, the transcript text had to be
s t r e t c h e d or shrinked in places; this does not, however, represent any paraor non-verbal data.)
14The ‘Workers’ Samaritans,’ or Arbeitersamariterbund in German, were
founded in 1888 as an organization for mutual help and assistance among
craftsmen. Today, they are an independent welfare association engaged in
life-saving services and disaster control but also in social services such as
assistance and transport for the disabled, ambulance, etc.
15This point about Mrs Kraft’s child is less incongruous than it might seem
from the segments I have cho
sen for this presentation. Children’s education is
indeed at stake. Mrs Beck is childless, and one of the issues on which turns
the insult affair is that in the past, Mrs Kraft insinuated that a childless woman is
socially inferior. Mrs Beck, in turn, claimed that Mrs Kraft is incapable of being
a good mother to her child and of giving the child a good education. (Which
insult was first seems to be a hen-and-egg question.)
16This kind of meta-discussion about the very conditions that have to obtain if
conflict resolution is to be achieved, i.e., a discussion about fundamentals of
discussing, taking place, metaphorically speaking, on a higher level of
discourse, is what an approach relying on Habermasian (1981) discourse
theory would have to assume (see, e.g., Kopperschmidt 1980; 1989).
Traditional epicheirematic reconstruction, e.g., according to Toulmin’s layout,
would probably end up with assuming a sub-discussion about the applicability
of the warrant to the given data/claim connection. (A ”dialogification” of
Toulmin’s layout has been proposed, e.g., by James Freeman (1991).) These
are valid reconstructions as far as the structure of a completed argumentation
is concerned. However, in line with Normative Pragmatics I take this to be

insufficient for displaying the dynamics of the communicative process of
arguing. Based on pragma-dialectical concepts (van Eemeren & Grootendorst
1992 : Part One; 1995 : 135–137), in Normative Pragmatics this kind of meta-,
or sub-discussion is reconstructed as the arguers’ suspending the discussion
for the time being and stepping back to the discussions ‘opening stage’; the
opening stage is a stage of the discussion which is, structurally speaking,
anterior to the argumentation proper and during which the arguers agree on
norms and rules which shall govern the discussion to come. As compared to
genuinely structural approaches, the assumption of a discontinuous opening
stage to which the arguers may step back at every moment is a substantial
improvement for the analysis of the process of arguing. Still, I would advocate,
rather, giving up the distinction between a level, or stage, for the discussion of
basic principles of discussing and a level, or stage, for the argumentative
discussion proper. There are two reasons for this: firstly, in authentic real-life
interactions, both levels very often cannot be delimited with absolute certainty,
and secondly, when this is possible, they influence upon each other to such an
extent as to make their separation for purposes of reconstruction alter
seriously the characteristics of the analyzed piece of dicourse.
17By demanding continuously her opponent’s sincerity, Mrs Beck has built up
sort of an ”all-or-nothing position” because of which she loses much of her own
credibility. Indeed, in terms of winning and losing – if they are applicable to a
mediation session –, Mrs Beck loses the mediation. Its outcome is the minimal
compromise the mediator headed for. Mrs Kraft apologizes for having insulted
her neighbor; but none of the further claims Mrs Beck brought up during the
mediation session is taken into consideration. Mrs Beck has even to
experience sort of a ”ceremonial degradation” for unreasonable
communicative behavior which is carried out by the mediator (see
Deppermann 1997 : 324–326).
18One of the most popular interpretations of this semiotic triangle is the one
offered by Charles Ogden and Ivor Richards (1923) in which a (linguistic) ‘form’
refers via a (conceptual) ‘meaning’ to a ‘thing’ in the world.
19From a genuinely structural perspective, de Chanay (1993) has offered a
similar account, based, as to its argumentation theoretical portion, on JeanClaude Anscombre & Oswald Ducrot’s Theory of argumentation within the
langue.
20I prefer to speak of ‘kind’ rather than of ‘type,’ ‘level,’ or ‘stage,’ because the
two kinds seem neither to be clearly separated in ongoing discussions nor to
constitute well-defined types of an exhaustive typology.
21The norms of co-operative, efficient arguing underlying the model of conflict
resolution which is advocated by Normative Pragmatics are reformulated as a
”dialectical decalogue” by the proponents of Pragma-Dialectics; see van
Eemeren & Grootendorst (1992; 1995).
22While in the mediation session I presented, this labeling seems not to have

strategic objectives, it is indeed a powerful tool with which one can block
discussion about a fact or action by denying it the label under which others
want it to be discussed. This manoeuvre has been known since Hermagoras of
Temnos’s classical stasis theory: a resource an advocate may use is to deny
that the action the defendant is accused of would indeed be a crime. One of
the most pervasive semantic struggles in our days has been the abortion
debate in which labels range from ‘interruption of pregnancy’ to ‘murder.’
Obviously, here the label is all but innocent; for depending on which label one
holds to be applicable to the fact, the way in which it is discussed – and
probably the matters discussed as well – will be different.
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